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THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH TO SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE
AND INVESTMENT: THE CASE OF ANGOLA
MICHELLE RATTON SANCHEZ BADrN** AND

FABIO MOROSINI***

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a slightly changing geography for trade and
investment flows, featuring a new role for developing countries. In 2013, foreign
direct investment ("FDI") flows to developing economies, the South, accounted for
fifty-four percent (U.S. $778 billion) of global inflows.' During this same period,
FDI flows to developed countries, the North, have accounted for only U.S. $566
billion.2 In relation to FDI outflow, the South has retained resilient records, rising
3
by three percent and reaching a new high of U.S. $454 billion; while the North,
which still accounts for sixty-one percent of global outflows, have stagnated at
4
U.S. $857 billion in 2013.
The increased share of developing country participation in global trade is also
noteworthy. While the share of world exports of developed countries dropped
from sixty-six percent in 1980 to fifty-three percent in 2011, the share of
developing economies rose from thirty-four percent to forty-seven percent in the
same time period. Part of this increase is attributable to trade performed among
developing countries. According to the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the
share of South-South trade in global trade rose from eight percent in 1990 to
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1. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014:
INVESTING IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN, at 36, U.N. SALES NO. E.14.1I.D.1 (2014) [hereinafter
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014].
2. Id.

3. Id. (explaining that according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), flows from Latin America and the Caribbean declined, while those from developing
Asia and Africa increased. Developing Asia accounts "for more than one fifth of the global total.")
4. Id.
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twenty-four percent in 2011.5 While North-South share has also slightly increased
in this period, from thirty-three to thirty-eight percent, North-North trade dropped
from fifty-six to thirty-six percent.6
Today's increase in the participation of the South in trade and investment
relations, including transactions with each other, is a result of a long-standing
contestation movement lead by a group of developing countries in reaction to
inequality in the international allocation of wealth. This movement can be traced
back to 1955, when a group of twenty-nine countries from Africa and Asia
convened in Bandung 7 and drafted a Final Communiqud of the Asian-African
conference. 8 This contestation movement, 9 among others, led to the creation of the
Group of 77,10 and its feats." t In the twenty-first century, new momentum on
South-South coalition for trade and investment matters is identified in initiatives
such as the BRICS countries, 12 the G20, 13 the IBSA forum, 14 and in the South5. WTO, World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade, 1,6 (2013)
]hereinafter World Trade Report 2013].
6. Id.
7. It has been argued that the Bandung Conference stands for a compromise between certain
developing countries as to the nature of South-South coalition in the context of severe South-North
contradictions and power imbalance between the strong North and the weak South. See An Chen, A
Reflection on the South-South Coalition in the Last Half Centuryfrom the Perspective of International
Economic Law-making: From Bandung, Doha and Cancin to Hong Kong, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
201,203 (2006).
8. This document, inter alia, considered problems of common interest to these countries and
proposed ways to achieve fuller economic co-operation in matters that included: promotion of economic
development in the Asia-African region; promotion of intra-regional trade; and the need for stabilizing
commodity trade in the region. Asian-African Conference, Final Communiqu6 of the Asian-African
Conference (Apr. 24, 1955), http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/BANDUNG55.PDF..
9. Id. See Chen, supranote 7.
10. The Group presently encompasses 134 members, and it is the largest organization of
developing countries in the U.N. and aims at promoting South-South cooperation for development and
enhancing developing country capacity in international economic matters. See About the Group of 77,
THE GROUP OF 77 AT THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.g77.org (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
11. Among its achievements, the Group of 77 promoted the partial reform of the GATT 1947
legal system, by advocating reformative guidelines on non-preferential treatment that is favorable to the
South. In addition, it pushed for the adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(CERDS). See Chen, supra note 7, at 204. See also G.A. Res. S-6/3201, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201
(May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 29/3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
12. Initially integrating Brazil, Russia, India, and China, BRIC was created in 2001 as an
analytical category for economic issues. In 2006, its members designed it as a formal arrangement,
joined by South Africa in 2011 and giving rise to the BRICS countries. See MINISTtRIO DAS
RELA 2OEs
EXTERIORES,
BRICS - Brasil, Rzissia, india, China 4frica do Sul,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=3672&catid=159&ltem
id=436&lang=pt-BR (last visited June 6, 2015) [hereinafter MIE, BRIC].
13. The group of twenty developing countries (G20), created in the preparatory meeting of the
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, in 2003, focused on a common negotiation position in agricultural
matters, in opposition to the North. See Nelson Giordano Delgado & Adriano Campolina de 0. Soares,
The G-20:lts Origin, Evolution, Meaning and Prospects, 25 GLOBAL ISSUE PAPERS 10 (2005),
www.globaltemative.org/downloads/GIP25-G20-en.pdf.
14. The IBSA forum was established in 2003 as a coordination mechanism based on political
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South cooperation movements.
In the context of the contemporary South-South trade and investment
relations, this paper suspects that a variety of legal instruments have been put in
place to regulate a plethora of different arrangements. If the paper takes the
example of Brazil, which has been characterized as one of the emerging leaders of
the new political economy, it takes notice that the country has signed few regional
trade agreements ("RTAs") and that it never ratified a bilateral investment treaty
("BIT"). Although Brazil does not rely on model-based agreements 15 to regulate
its trade and investment relations, the flows of commerce to and from the country
has increased in the last decades, as well as its inward and outward investments'
flows. What is then happening in Brazil with respect to trade and investment
regulation? Are there other legal arrangements that may be promoting the
increasing flow of investment and trade of the country? If so, are they in
consonance with the models of RTAs and of BITs?
In order to answer these questions, this paper has chosen the example of the
economic relations established between Brazil and Angola. As one of the largest
economies in Africa,' 6 it should not be a surprise that Angola is the country with
which Brazil has increased its flow of investment and trade in the last ten to fifteen
years. While in 2002, Brazil's investment flows to Angola were about U.S. $18
million; in 2012 they were about U.S. $1 billion. 17 Angola exports to Brazil
increased from U.S. $11 million in 2002 to U.S. $726 million in 2013.18 Brazil's
alignment, sectorial cooperation and the creation of the IBSA Fund. Its political alignment is to be
expressed in several multilateral fora, including the WTO, and IBSA sectorial cooperation involves
sixteen working groups, including one on trade and investment. See MINISTtRIO DAS RELAoES
do
Sul,
e
Africa
Diilogo
india,
Brasi
IBAS-F6rum
de
EXTERIORES,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.phpoption=com-content&view=article&id=3673&catid=1 70&Item
id=436&lang=pt-BR [hereinafter MRE, IBSA].
15.

See COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Chester Brown ed. 2013)

(discussing 17 model BITs and their underlying investment policies). See also Henrik Horn et al.,
Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, 7 BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT

SERIES 1 (2009) (analyzing the content of E.U. and U.S. preferential trade agreements in comparison to
their WTO commitments).
th
16. Angola's GDP in 2013 was the 6 largest of the African continent, amounting U.S.$130
billion. And, during the period from 2005 until 2013 was the sole, besides Ethiopia, to have a two-digit
annual GDP growth. The data was obtained before the African Economic Outlook. African Economic
Outlook 2014: Global Value Chains and Africa's Industrialization, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/. We should also remember that Africa has been appointed as
the next market to conquer, considering its natural resources and promising consumer market, based on
its demographic outlook. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 1; World Trade Report,
supranote 5.
17. Tabela; 2001 a 2006, Data from CapitaisBrasileiro no Exterior: Estatisticas econdmicas 2001 a 2006, BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, http://www4.bcb.gov.br/Rex/CBE/ftp/CBETab2006.xls

(last visited May 2014). Tabela; 2007 a 2013, Data from Capitais Brasileirono Exterior: Estatisticas
econ6micas

-

2007

a

2013,

BANCO

CENTRAL

DO

BRASIL,

http://www4.bcb.gov.br/Rex/CBE/ftp/CBE_2007-2013_results.xls (last visited May 2014).
18. MINISTtRIO DO DESENVLVIMENTO, INDUSTRIA E COMERCIO EXTERIOR, Balanga comercial

brasileira: Paises e Blocos: lntercdmbio comercial brasileiro: Paises e Blocos Econdmicos,
(adding Angola in
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br//sitio/intema/intema.php?area=5&menu=576
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exports to Angola increased from U.S. $199 million in 2002 to U.S. $1,271 billion
in 2013.19 What justifies the choice of Angola is, then, not the volume of
economic flows, nor the margin that it takes in Brazilian overall trade and
investment flows (about 0.4 percent), but its four times increase in the last few
years. Angola-Brazil trade and investment flows have been one of the most
dynamic for the economies of both countries in the last years.
What is the role of law in promoting trade and investment between Brazil and
Angola? The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that if there was such an
increase in Brazil-Angola economic relations, they might have had legal
arrangements supporting this movement. The questions that arise are: (1) if Brazil
does not structure its trade and investment relations in RTAs and BITs?; (2) what
are the main legal instruments leading these processes?; and (3) what types of legal
institutions are each of these two countries mobilizing? This paper will look at the
characteristics of the policies supporting this movement and rules designed to
promote that increase of economic relations, and how they may blur some concepts
on international economic law ("IEL").2 ° In order to develop the proposed
analysis, we conducted a case study of Brazil-Angola trade and investment
relations, and followed it with preliminary concluding remarks.
Angola suffers from a limitation on publicly available data. Similarly,
information on Brazil and Angola negotiations is also scarce. This feature of
Angola is due to political disputes during the civil war, which lasted until 2002,
and a lack of transparency, leading to the inclusion of a confidentiality clause in
many of the agreements negotiated between Angola and Brazil. In this context,
empirical research was crucial to this project. Besides a bibliographical survey, we
also conducted a search for primary sources in historical databases and performed
eight exploratory interviews with Brazilian officials, businessmen, NGOs'
activists, and academics working on the field. None of the interviewees will be
identified at this point.

Por Pais search field) (last visited Nov. 18, 2015) [hereinafter MDIC].
19. Id. In this period, Brazil imported almost exclusively crude oil and liquefied natural gas; and
the country exported to Angola, in decreasing order, meat, sugar, and mechanical machines.
BRASILGLOBALNET, http://www.brasilglobalnet.gov.br (last visit June 2014).
20. See Federico Ortino & Matteo Ortino, Law of the Global Economy: In Need of a New
Methodological Approach?, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE State AND THE FUTURE OF THE
DISCIPLINE 89 (Colin Picker et al. eds., 2008) (discussing methods in international economic law).
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ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND BRAZIL

A.

Brazil'spolicy towards Africa in the 1960s: Fillinga "political
,,21

vacuum

Brazil was the first country to recognize Angola's claim for independence in
1975, in what was considered a dissenting move during the Cold War. 2 Ernesto
Geisel (1974-1979) was the Brazilian President at the time. Geisel became known
for promoting an independent foreign policy and, domestically, for having
promoted the strengthening of state companies, and the coordination of a new
policy for the energy sector.23 As part of the latter, we highlight the construction
of Hydropower Company of Itaipu Binacional, the creation of Brazil's National
Ethanol Program (known as "Pro-Alcohol"), the nuclear agreements with
Germany, and, above all, the search for alternative oil suppliers. 24 Angola became
then one alternative at that high point of the global oil crises.
Although Geisel's pragmatic policy towards the new independent countries in
Africa had a welcome commercial effect-establishing a market to the excess of
Brazilian manufactures and guarantying the provision of oil 25 -- academic experts

21. "Political vacuum" is an expression applied by some Brazilian experts on the foreign policy
of the country. In the case of the African continent, the expression suggests that, although few
movements of Brazil towards Africa may be identified in the country's history, there was no structured
policy until the 1960s. There was a vacuum on the conception of a South Atlantic region that was
explored by a more independent foreign policy designed as from the 1960s, and implemented during the
1970s. See Interview with Ant6nio Azeredo da Silveira, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Braz., in
Rio de Janerio, Braz. (1978) [hereinafter Interview with Silveira] (on file with authors); AMADO LuIz
CERVO & CLODOALDO BUENo, HIST6RIA DA POLiTICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL 397-426 (3rd ed.2010);
Jos6 Fldvio S. Saraiva, Um Momento Especial nas Relaqo6es Brasil-Angola: Do Reconhecimento da
Independ~ncia aos Desdobramos Atuais, in ANGOLA E BRASIL NAS ROTAS Do ATLNTICO SUL 225,
225-54 (1999); Encontros com a civiliza~go brasileira (Civilizagdo brasileira eds., Issue 1-4 1978).
22. UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY (Rex A. Hudson ed.,
1997),http://countrystudies.us/brazil/. When Brazil recognized Angola as an independent country, the
party in power, Movimento Popularpela Libertaqdo de Angola (MPLA), was considered a Marxist
group, and it had significant connection with the U.R.S.S at the time. On the opposite side, during the
1970s, Latin America was condemned as the back garden of the U.S. foreign politics. Saraiva, supra
note 21, at 225. This support was, however, a push in the Brazilian foreign policy to a coordination of
non-aligned countries that was supposed to incorporate the new independent countries in Africa and
Asia, besides Latin America. ELI ALVES PENHA, RELA(COEs BRASIL-AFRICA E GEOPOLiTICA DO
ATLANTICO SUL 162 (2011).
23. AMADO Luiz CERVO & CLODOALDO BUENO. HIST6RIA DA POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL
441-2 (4th ed. 2014).
24. Curiously, right before becoming President of the country, Geisel occupied the presidency of
Petrobras, the state oil company of Brazil, from 1969-1974. And from that period, Geisel followed the
success of oil prospection in Angola. See MARIA CELINA D'ARAUJO & CELSO CASTRO, ERNESTO
GEISEL (1994).
25. Brazil is considered today as auto-sufficient in oil provision, but, from 1975 to 1979, oil
imports accounted for 70% of all imports by Brazil. PENHA, supra note 22, at 171. This policy was
qualified as a "responsible pragmatism" by the minister in charge of Foreign Affairs at the time,
Ant6nio Azeredo de Silveira. See Interview with Silveira, supra note 21, at 46-7 (discussing this
turning policy); Interview by Aspdsia Alcdntara de Camargo et. al., with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, in
Rio
de
Janerio, Braz.,
at 221
(1985)
[hereinafter
Interview with
Guerreiro],
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and officials in Brazil concur that this policy should not be read as limited to
commercial ties. 26 As in the independence process, in its relationship with Angola,
Brazil always evokes historical and cultural similarities, geographical conditions,
as well as economic and political advantages of an alliance of southern countries.27
As a consequence, the official discourse always gets back to the gracious landmark
of 1975 and its narratives.
Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa, including Angola, has been described
as cyclical. 28 However, the diplomatic narrative tends to shape the perception of
continuity of the Angola-Brazil relationship. For example, after the downturn of
Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s, in 2003, President Lula, in
his first year in charge, visited Luanda and declared in the bilateral ministerial
meeting:
Angola and Brazil are long-standing partners, and these countries are
This
consolidating and expanding their cooperation now....
relationship is based upon spontaneous affinities, and mutual solidarity.

Angola is, since its Independence, a priority
These are the reasons why
29
to Brazilian diplomacy.

Cooperation has been the leitmotiv of this pragmatic approach by these two
countries placed on the political South of the globe. 30 This is clear in all official
statements by Brazilian diplomatic representatives, as well as in the letter of the
legal instruments signed between Angola and Brazil.3 1 South-South cooperation,
http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/historal/arq/Entrevista841.pdf. See also CERVO, supra note 23, at 420-42;
PENHA, supra note 22, at 168.
26. See CERVO, supranote 23, at 420-42; PENHA, supra note 22, at 164.
27. See D'ARAUJO, supra note 24. For more about the recognition of Angolan independence by
Brazil in the testimony of both Ant6nio Azeredo Silveira, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge at
that moment, and Ramiro Guerreiro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1979 until 1985 see tnterivew
with Silveira, supra note 21, at 3-5; Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 209-19.
28. Jos6 Sombra Saraiva, considered one of the most prominent experts on Africa in the Brazilian
foreign policy context, describes this cyclical movement as composed by "opportunities, downturns,
and overturns." Jos6 Flvio S. Saraiva, Politica Exterior do Governo Lula: 0 Desaflo Africano, 45
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE POLITICA INTERNACIONAL 5, 18 (2002).
29. Ministrrio das Relagdes Exteriores, RELAT6RIO DE POLiTICA EXTERNA: POSI(OEs DO

(2007),
166
of Brasil]
Position
Handbook:
Policy
[Foreign
Brasilia
BRASIL.
http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/388-Repertorio-dePollticaExterna_Posicoes do Brasil.pdf.
30. From 1950, South-South cooperation-between developing countries and new independent
states, which were known as the third world at the time-was part of a movement of contestation of the
international order. The landmark of this movement is the Bandung Conference in 1955. But, the main
concerns of South-South cooperation began to be designed in 1974, when the United Nations General
Assembly "[e]ndorses the establishment of a special unit within the United Nations Development
Programme to promote technical co-operation among developing countries... with the objective of
integrating this activity of technical co-operation among developing countries fully within the
Programme." G.A. Res. A/3251 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3251 (XXIX), at 2 (Dec. 4, 1974). See
UNITED

NATIONS

OFFICE

FOR

SOUTH-SOUTH

COOPERATION,

Background,

http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/aboutfBackground.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
3 1. See High-level Comm. on South-South Cooperation on Frame of Operational Guidelines on
United Nations Support to South-South and Triangular Cooperation on Its Seventeenth Session, U.N.
Doc. SSC/17/3 (2012) for an illustration of consolidated priniciples of South-South cooperation today,

2015

THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH: THE CASE OF ANGOLA

495

as a marginal and alternative movement, incorporates many elements-some of
them complementary and others even paradoxical. This cooperation intends to go
32
beyond Official Development Aid ("ODA"), having as a guiding principle the
33
But, it is also fundamentally based on the
non-conditionality of assistance.
between southern countries. The United
trade
expansion of investment and
reaffirmed these particularities, and their
recently
General
Assembly
Nations

importance:
Flows of development assistance from the North and the South are
significantly different, however, and South-South cooperation is much
wider than financial and technical support; it is a broad consultative and
collaborative process engaging all developing countries, aimed at
improving their collective economic, social, and political capacity and
34

welfare.

Brazil and Angola signed about seventy agreements and protocols. 35 The
"Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement," signed on June 11,
1980, was the first-and amongst the most important agreements.36 This
agreement opened the possibility of being amended and further detailed by later
agreements and contracts between the parties, 37 and it also established a Joint
Commission to manage bilateral relations.38 The "Economic, Scientific and
Technical Cooperation Agreement" became the umbrella agreement to fifteen
complementary agreements and three protocols, signed from the 1980s until
today. 39 The Joint Commission has been in charge of promoting cooperation
which
were already part of the preamble of the Acordo de Coopera ;o Econ6mica, Cientifica e T~cnica
[Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement], Angl.-Braz., June 11, 1980, http://daimre.serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1980/b 52 [hereinafter Economic, Scientific, and
Technical Cooperation Agreement] ("Taking into account the shared goal to increase the economic,
technical, and scientific development, in both countries, respecting the principles of equality, respect for
national sovereignty, and of non-interference in domestic affairs .... ) (translation by authors).
32. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Official Development Assistance-Definition and
Coverage, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (last
visited Aug. 6, 2015).
33.

See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION,

What is South-South

Cooperation?,http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what-isssc.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2015).
34. G.A. Res. A/67/208, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/208 (July 30, 2012).
35. For a search database of all agreements and protocols between Brazil and Anogla, see
SISTEMA CONSULAR INTEGRADO, http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/pesquisa ato bil.
36. See Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31. The
agreement was ratified in Brazil in October 5 1h,1990. See Decreto No. 99.559, de 5 de Outubro de
(Braz.),
de
99.559
[D.E.C.]
EXECUTIVO
DO
DECRETO
1990,
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D99559.htm.
37. Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31, art. 3.
38. Id. at art. 11.
39. Brazilian Foreign Ministry classifies as "complementary agreements" (in Portuguese, acordos
de ajuste complementar) those that detail certain issues or their implementation processes, making
reference to a previous understanding between the parties. Protocols, on the other hand, are more
informal agreements. Tipos de atos internacionais, SISTEMA CONSULAR INTEGRADO, http://daimre.serpro.gov.br/apresentacao/tipos-de-atos-intemacionais/ (last visited June 2014) (describing these
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initiatives and other issues of mutual interest.4 °
B.

Alternative tools for trade and investment flows between Angola and
Brazil
1.

Countertrade, pledged credits, and collateralized loans

The relationship between Angola and Brazil clearly took into account the
limited influence of their policies and partnerships at the global level, especially in
contesting their North-South relation.
However, as described below, both
countries often tried to expand their South-South policy space, creating alternatives
to make the increase of their economic flows possible.
The Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed
during a time 4 1 when the model of development for most of Latin America,
including Brazil, and Africa was collapsing. The credit crisis and high interest
rates were common topics, although they affected Africa and Latin American
economies differently.42 The economic relations between Angola and Brazil in the
1970s had been structured in terms of trade flows that exchanged the manufactured
and semi-manufactured goods from Brazil with oil products from Angola.43 1979
marked the first FDI flows from Brazil towards Angola, with the investments of
the Brazilian state-owned company, Petrobras, in Angola's oil sector. 4
This
investment was a combination of access to oil sources and opportunities of exports
45
of Brazilian products and technology.

types and classification of international understandings). For a more detailed analysis about the
Agreements signed by Brazil with Angola and other African countries, see WILSON MENDON( A
JINIOR, POLITICA EXTERNA E COOPERAAO TtCNIA: AS RELA(OES Do BRASIL COM A AFRICA

DURANTE OS ANOS FHC E LULA DA SILVA 117-41(2013).

40. The last meeting that we could have access of the Joint Commission was in 2011. This
Commission still exists, but since 2010, according to the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership
signed by the Presidents from Angola and Brazil a second institutional space was created, called
Permanent Bilateral Commission in charge of supervising the implementation of the Strategic Plan
(Section E.27) of the Statement. See Josd Eduardo dos Santos, President of Angola, Joint Statement on
visit to Brazil (June 23, 2010), in 106 RESENHAS DE POLITICA EXTERIOR DO BRASIL, no. 112, 2013, at
491-94,
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id= 10227&ltemid=747&la
ng'-pt-BR (last access Nov. 16, 2015).
41. Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31; Decreto N'
99.559, supranote 36.
42. See Dharam Ghai & Cynthia Hewitt de Alcdntara, The Crisis of the 1980s in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Impact, Social Change and the Political
Implications,21 DEV. & CHANGE 389, 401-3 (1990).
43. PENHA, supra note 22, at 170-71.
44. LOURDES CASANOVA, GLOBAL LATINAS: LATIN AMERICA'S EMERGING MULTINATIONALS 53

(Plagrave Macmillian ed., 2009).
45. Petrobras had launched its internationalization process in 1972, creating its subsidiary
Braspetro for investment outside Brazil. Petrobras, at that moment, had the strategy of investing abroad
in order to open and develop the market for the products and technology developed in Brazil. This was
possible due to the fact that by the middle of the 1970s Petrobras had already been able to catch up to
the international technology in the sector. The internationalization was also one of the strategies to
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From 1984 on, Brazil recognized the possibility of "countertrade" in its
relations with African countries, due to the international financial crisis, the lack of
money, and the exceeding goods and services.46 Brazil chose a selected group of
countries to promote this exchange, amongst them Angola.47 This was an
inventive solution in a critical moment for both countries' model of development.
The financial and debt crisis was not the only difficulty that Angola was
facing in the 1980s. In 1979, after the death of its first president, Agostinho Neto,
the main opposing political movement, Unido Nacional para a Independkncia
Total de Angola ("UNITA") contested the appointment of the new president, Jos6
Eduardo dos Santos from the Movimento Popular de Libertavao de Angola
("MPLA" ).4 As a result, a civil war started, lasting until 2002. 4 9 During the civil
war, the Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement was amended
by a Complementary Agreement on Trade Topics ("the Complementary
Agreement")5" and a Protocol on Communication issues, which were both signed
in 1983.51 The Complementary Agreement was designed mainly for financing
purposes, establishing the framework of financial support for trade and
investments between Angola and Brazil 2
The Complementary Agreement aimed to i) on its trade facet, guarantee the
supply of food and other goods of basic needs, as well as raw materials, to Angola
during its reconstruction period; 53 and ii) on its trade in service and investment
facets, guarantee the supply of service and material to Capanda Hydropower
54
Project, undertaken by Odebrecht, a Brazilian private company, among others.
All such operations were financed by Banco do Brasil S.A., a semi-public
company, through the Chamber of Foreign Trade ("CACEX"), created in the
overcome the limits imposed by the international oil crisis. Francisco Jose Mattoso Paiva, Proposta de
Varidveis Vriticas Para o Modelo Preliminar de Apoio ADecis~o de Aquisigio de Refinarias em Novos
Mercados 17 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ponticica Universidade Cat6lica do Rio de
Janeiro); Armando Dalla Costa & Hiiscar Fialho Pessali, A Trajetrria de Internacionalizagdo da
Petrobrasna lndzdstria de Petrdleo e Derivados, 12 HIST6RIA ECONOMICA e HISTRIA de EMPRESAS
5, 17-8 (2009).
46. PENHA, supranote 22, at 174.
47. See id. Examples on countertrade in that period are registered in the interview given by
Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of that period. Interview with
Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 10.
48. DAVID SEDDON WITH DANIEL SEDDON-DAINES, A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DICTIONARY
OF AFRICA: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AFRICA 33 (1 st ed. 2005).

49. Adam Taylor, A 27-year Civil War, For No Reason At All, The Washington Post, Oct. 14,
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/14/a-27-year-civil-war-for-noreason-at-all/.
50. Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao Econ6mica, Cientifica e T~cnica, de
11/06/80, na Area de Comdrcio, Angl.-Braz., Apr. 12, 1983, http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atosintemacionais/bilaterais/1983/b_17 [hereinafter The Complementary Agreement]..
51. Protocolo Adicional ao Acordo de Cooperaq8o Econbmica, Cientifica e Trcnica sobre
Oct. 20, 1983, http://daino Campo das Comunicag6es, Angl.-Braz.,
Cooperaq8o
mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-intemacionais/bilaterais/1983/b_53/.
52. The Complementary Agreement, supra note 50.
53. Id. at art. I.
54. Id at art. II.
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1950s to finance exports from Brazil." Under that agreement, Brazil agreed to
provide one million U.S. dollars as credit for trade and investment operations with
Angola. 56 The main innovation of this financing process was that the parties to the
Complementary Agreement-Angola and Brazil-used oil to collateralize the
loan. The Angolan government pledged to provide twenty thousand barrels of oil
per day to guarantee the loan. 57 The structure of the whole operation should, then,
follow the four-level scheme below:
58
Figure 1: The coordination of four levels for financing trade operations
Level 1
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Brazilian

Complementary

government

cooperation framework agreement
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55. J.M. Finger & Julio J. Nogurs, Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade
Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire 86 (2006). CACEX, as the administrative agency for allocating
the finance governmental support, was considered the main body for the implementation of import
substitution and export promotion developmental policy from 1960 until 1990, when it was
extinguished. During that period, CACEX operated as an export credit agency (ECA) in Brazil. For
more about CACEX, and the Brazilian developmental policy of that period may be found, see Andre
Luiz da Silva Reis, Do substituiqdo de importaqdo d substituigdo de exportaqdo, Rev. Bras. Polit. Int.
vol. 48, n. 2 (2005).
56. Daniel Zirker, Brazilian Foreign Policy and Subimperialism During the Political Transition of
the 1980s: A Review and Reapplication of Marini's Theory, Latin American Perspectives vol. 21 no.],
115, 127 (1994), http://lap.sagepub.com/content/21/1/115.full.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Figure 1 was prepared by the authors, based on the 1983 Complementary Agreement on
Trade. This type of operation came to be called as "Angola model," as a reference on how developing
countries rich on natural resources may find alternatives to access financial support to their economic
promotion. In that respect, the Report of the U.N. Secretary General on South-South Cooperation in
describing the standard legal structure of the operation for China operations with Angola does it in three
levels of legal commitments:
China, the largest source of South-South infrastructure financing, follows a unique process in
taking on responsibility for infrastructure projects that are identified through bilateral
negotiations and mutual agreements. In dealing with countries that cannot provide adequate
guarantees that loans will be repaid, it follows what has come to be known as the "Angola
model", a barter arrangement under which a Government pledges natural resource supplies in
return for the infrastructure built by Chinese firms. This involves agreements at three levels.
The first is a special framework agreement between Governments outlining the principles for
cooperation. The second is agreement by banks and the supplier of raw materials. The third
step involves the African Government signing work contracts with companies recommended
by the China International Contractors Association, with labour performed by both Chinese
and local workers.
U.N. Secretary-General, The State of South-South Cooperation:Rep. of the Secretary-General, 27,
U.N. Doc. A/67/208 (July 30, 2012).
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It is hard to identify where and when the public and the private interests and
legal forms prevail in the Figure 1 coordination. Taking into consideration the
59
magnitude of the Capanda Hydropower project, the contracts signed between
Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, Technopromexport, and the Government of
Angola also established guarantees to the contracts, backed by Angola's oil
production. Odebrecht stated this was an innovative suggestion by its business
were
director at the time, Marc Altit, considering that Capanda's first documents
61
of Angola.
signed in 1981 by foreign investors and the government
The construction of Capanda Hydropower station started in 1984, but the
power plant became one of the main targets of attack during the period of the civil
62
war that lasted until 2002. 62 The construction was interrupted in 1992 and resumed
eight years later. 63 The first part of the project-two turbines-was concluded in
2005, and the last two turbines in 2007.64 In these three decades, Odebrecht never
ceased investing in Angola, becoming the country's largest employer in that
period. 65 The length of the Capanda project and the significant involvement of a
59. The Washington Post Special Report on Angola classified Capanda Project as the largest
infrastructure ever in Angola. Brazilian and Russian companies mainly constructed this project, and its
cost is estimated in more than U.S.$4 billion. Province of Kwanza Norte: Water of Life, THE
WASHINGTON POST, April 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpadv/specialsales/spotlight/angola/article2l.html. For more details on the joint venture by Odebrecht and
Technopromexport, the Russian state-company, see ODEBRECHT, 0 FUTURO EM CONSTRU(;,kO:
ODEBRECHT EANGOLA 81-119 (Odebrecht ed., 2009); Carine Kiala & Nomfundo Ngwenya, Angola's
Strategic Co-operation with the BRIC Countries,85 S. AFR. FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICAN DRIVERS
PROGRAMME OCCASIONAL PAPER 11-2 (2011), http://www.saiia.org.za/doc-view/61 -angola-sstrategic-co-operation-with-the-bric-countrics.
60.

ODEBRECHT,

supra note 59, at 84.

61. Id.
62. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, AFRICAN DAMS BRIEFING 2010, at 2-3 (Intemational Rivers Africa
Program ed., 2010), https://www.intemationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/afrdamsbriefingjune20lO.pdf. The civil war was the period considered since the independence of
Angola in 1975 until 2002, when Frente Nacional pela Libertago de Angola (FNLA), that was the
party in power, signed the Memorandum of Understanding of Lusaka, with the rebels representing
UNITA. For more information about these parties and the civil war, see Adriano Ibraim e Ramos de
Souza et al., Guerra Civil E 0 Desenvolvimento Econ6mico Em Angola, 7 Revista de Economia da
UEG, no. 2, at 6 (2011).
63. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, supranote 62; see also ODEBRECHT, supra note 59.
64. ODEBRECHT, supra note 59, at 110-7. See also HYDROELECTRIC STATION POWERED UP IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA: WIRE SAWING IS CRITICAL TO NEW DAM'S SUCCESS, reprintedin 15 CONCRETE

OPENINGS no. 1 (2006),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.csda.org/resource/resmgr/imported/March%
Station%20Africa%20PSC.pdf.
65.
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Brazilian private company with Angola's economy put them in a central place in
the economic cooperation between Angola and Brazil, as described below.
2.

Liberal policies understating the cooperation discourse

Positive results are reported as a consequence of those initiatives on economic
cooperation and its legal framework. 66 However, by 1982-1983, both countries
started to suffer the negative effects of the international financial crisis in central
economies. 67 The fast growing interest rates applicable to the debts incurred by
developing countries, combined with the shortage of foreign currency in their local
markets, naturally, led to a trade decrease between Brazil and Angola.68 Although
the two countries made efforts to maintain the same trade levels, at the end of the
"lost decade" for both their domestic economic and financial systems, their
69
exchange became much less relevant.
The dark scenario of the 1980s did not inhibit Angola and Brazil from signing
a few other agreements for bilateral cooperation or a set of protocols of intent.70
Such agreements and protocols focused on transports rules and technical
cooperation in specific areas. 71 Financial constraints, however, limited the reach of
PARCERIA SUL-SUL PARA 0 CRESCIMENTO [BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC-BRAZIL AND SUB-SAHARAN

AFRICA: SOUTH-SOUTH PARTNERING FOR GROWTH] 87 (IPEA ed., 2011),
http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/livros/livros/1 20113_livropontesobreoatlanticopor2.
pdf
Silveira illustrated that the trade flows with Angola had increased 550 per cent since the 1960s. More
than two hundred Brazilian companies, including banks, decided to invest in Africa, Angola included,
under different forms of investment and partnerships with local economic agents; legal instruments and
alternative financing structures were developed in order to compensate the limited economic resources
of both Angola and Brazil. Interview with Silveira, supra note 21. See also PENHA, supra note 22, at
172.
67. Interview with Guerreiro, supra note 25, at 174-5.
68. The reasons for moratorium established by developing countries - such as Brazil in 1987 that
became well known for being the country with the largest external debt at the time (107 billion U.S.
dollars) - were far beyond their control. Due to domestic concerns, governments in central economies
substantially raised interest rates - an unforeseeable measure at the period that developing countries
were borrowing the money. This justifies why some policy makers and scholars from developing
countries reframe the debt crises of developing countries as a financial crises on developed countries
with spillovers to developing countries. On this sense, see Interview with Guerreiro, supra note 25, at
174-5.
69. In 1989, the exports between Brazil and Angola were U.S. $115.562.021, while the imports
were U.S. $50.607.334, both of which were calculated values in FOB. Import Query, ALICEWEB,
http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br//index/home (follow Import 1989-1996 NBM 10 digits hyperlink; then
search
under
Angola
during
1989
period);
Export
Query,
ALICEWEB,
http://aliceweb.mdic.gov.br//index/home (follow Export 1989-1996 NBM 10 digits hyperlink; then
search under Angola during 1989 period).
70. Scholars called it a selective policy towards Africa: due to its economic and political
constraints Brazil had selected a few countries in the continent that should be kept as priorities in its
foreign policy. Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa were on this list, as well as the new initiative of
the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), created in 1996. See Claudio Oliveira
Ribeiro, Relag6es Polttico-Comerciais Brasil-Africa (1985-2006) (Nov. 7, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Universidade de SAo Paulo) (on file with USP Catalog).
71. Specifically, Angola and Brazil had six agreements: Agreement on Air Transport; the
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those projects. 72 Financial institutions in Brazil were not able to give the decisive
support-as in the earlier years-due to: i) Brazil's high external debt that would
culminate in the 1987 moratorium, limiting the sources of Brazilian export credit
institutions; ii) the neoliberal reforms adopted in Brazil, reducing the size of the
state and its financing capacity; iii) international commitments under the letters of
intent ruling new loans taken before the IMF reinforced neoliberal policies in
Brazil; and iv) Brazil's decision to emphasize support for the U.N.-coordinated
Verification Mission or
peace missions in Angola (United Nations Angola
73
civil war.
the
to
end
an
promote
to
"UNAVEM"),
74
Angola
By 1994, the government of Angola suspended all oil collaterals.
had a debt at the time of about U.S. $800 million with Brazilian governmental
credit agencies. Such suspension contributed to a further decrease in investment
flows from Brazil to Angola. In 1995, Brazil's trade account with Angola reached
75
The recovery of
a deficit of U.S. $41 million with Angola, for the first time.
collateral agreements would be instrumental for the relaunch of the Capanda
project. 76 Accordingly, in August 15, 1995, Brazil and Angola signed a Debt

Agreement on Shipping; the Complementary Agreement on Agriculture Research and Rural Extension;
and the three Protocols of Intent i) on Technical Cooperation on Geology and Mining, ii) on Electric
Energy and Water and iii) on Educational development. See Protocolo de Inten 6es sobre Cooperaqlo
T6cnica no Dominio da Geologia e Mineravao [Protocol on Intent on Technical Cooperation on
Geology and Mining], Angl.-Braz., July 15, 1992; Protocolo de Intenq6es sobre Cooperaqto T6cnica no
Dominio de Energia Eltrica e Aguas [Protocol of Intent on Electric Energy and Water], Angl.-Braz.,
July 15, 1992; Protocolo de Inteng6es na Area de Desenvolvimento Educacional [Protocol of Intent on
Educational Development], Angl.-Braz., Sept. 10, 1991; Acordo no Dominio dos Transportes
Maritimos [Agreement on Shipping], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 1, 1989; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de
Coopera95o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Thcnica na Area de Pesquisa Agricola e Extenso Rural
[Complementary Agreement on Agriculture Research and Rural Extension], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 1, 1989;
Acordo de Transporte A6reo [Agreement on Air Transport], Angl.-Braz.,Apr. 12, 1983.
72. Interview with Guerreiro, supranote 25; Ribeiro, supranote 70, at 136.
73. There were three main peacekeeping missions organized by the United Nations during the
period of the civil war, and Brazil contributed to all of them and became the major contributor of forces
in the last phase: UNAVEM 1, (1988-1991); UNAVEM 11 (1991-1995), and UNAVEM (1995-1997).
For the establishment of the missions, see S.C. Res. 976, 50th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/976 (Feb. 8,
1995); S.C. Res. 696, 46th Year, U.N. Doc. S[RES/696 (May 30, 1991); S.C. Res. 626, 43rd Year, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/626 (Dec. 20, 1988); and for full information see U.N. Dept. of Pub. Info., United Nations
1997) (unofficial document of U.N.),
Angola Verification Mission IIl (June 30,
For details about the Brazilian
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavemp.htm.
participation, see Exdrcito Brasileiro, Missbes de Paz [Peace Missions] (July, 2014),
http://www.eb.mil.br/unavem.
74. Saraiva, supranote 21, at 219-20.
75. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS [Braz.], Working Visit of the Minister of State of Angola, at
26 (1999) (explaining Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Angola, visit on "trade, debt
and bilateral cooperation; interest of Brazilian companies; the CPLP and the situtations in GuineaCongo."),
of
Republic
Democratic
the
and
Bissau
http://docvirt.com/docreaderFGV/DocReader.aspx?bib=ACiLFL MRE2&PagFis=2694&Pesq=.
76. Taking into account the Presidential diplomacy in the 1980 and 1990s, it is possible to state
that this investment project (Capanda Hydropower Project) never lost its particular relevance in the
Brazilian policy. See ODEBRECHT, supranote 59, at 109-10, 134-5.
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Rescheduling Agreement.77
Cardoso's speech during the signature of the Debt Rescheduling Agreement
reinforced this perspective:
We are looking for solutions that enable us to reopen credit lines to
Angola, and then increase Brazilian investments in the country. We
state our engagement to find a solution for the bilateral debt. This is the
guarantee that we have - most importantly - a positive agenda to
manage, paving the way for increasing commerce, cooperation, and
investments flows that have been the core of our bilateral relations.78
The Rescheduling terms: i) recognized a debt of 382 million U.S. dollars by
Angola of the principal, plus 54 million U.S. dollars on interests due; 79 ii) defined a
fifteen-year term for payment; 80 and iii)detailed the applicable interest rate, 8 ' the
ranking of competing debts in Brazil,82 and a most favored nation clause.83 Such
terms add novelty to debtor/ creditor countries' negotiations in three areas: i)
although signed as an international agreement, it incorporates an applicable law
and dispute settlement clause, as well as enforcement actions to the bills, similar to
private contracts; 84 ii) it establishes a debt-swap provision; 85 and iii) it binds the
supply of oil to the payment of the debt, according to an additional memorandum
of understanding signed by the parties on the same date.86
Although the
Angola/[Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MoU-1995) is not available for
87
public consultation, this mechanism is the most relevant to our analysis.
Article IX of the Rescheduling Debt Agreement stipulates that the payment of
each installment of the renegotiated debt and its interests shall be made from the
revenues of Angolan oil sales to Brazil. 8 The due amount should then be paid by

77. Acordo para Reescalonamento de Divida [Agreement for Debt Rescheduling], Angl.-Braz.,
Aug. 15, 1995.
78. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil, Speech at the siging of the Debt
Rescheduling Agreement (Aug. 15, 1995).
79. Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77, at art. I.
80. Id. at art. II.
81. Id. at art. III, IV, VI.
82. Id. at art. V.
83. Id. at art. XIV.
84. Id. at art. XII, annex B.
85. Id. at art. IX, annex C.
86. Id. at art. IX.
87. Public access to documents supporting Brazil-Angola relations has been a hot topic in Brazil
in the last years, considering the increase of economic transactions with Angola. Even though Brazil
has recently approved a Law on Access to Public Information (Law N. 12,527, as of November 18,
2011), the 1980 Cooperation Agreement established the confidentiality as the guiding rule of the parties
understandings: "Each contracting party shall ensure confidential treatment of all documents,
information, and any other knowledge acquired during the term of this agreement, as well as their noncirculation to a third party without previous written consent by the other party." Economic, Scientific,
and Technical Cooperation Agreement, supra note 31, at art. X (translation by the authors). See also,
Lei No. 12.527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011 (Braz.).
88. Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77, at art. IX.
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89
Moreover, the payment
the amount of receivables from oil exports to Brazil.
shall be deposited in a Grand Cayman Island account of Banco do Brasil-the
90
Brazilian banking institution that worked as the export credit agency in the past.
Additionally, twenty percent of the receivables should remain in an escrow91
account of the same bank. The amount of this second account could be swapped
into Brazilian public securities debts; otherwise, could anticipate the payments in
the first account. 92 The payment of Angola's debts to Brazil, based on previous
trade and investment financing, was therefore also backed by oil exports. The
"Angola model" played a role in this type of financial arrangement93 as follows:
payments
Figure 2: Coordinating the four levels for debt
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government

Rescheduling
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A second particularity of that debt renegotiation is that, for the first time in
Angola-Brazil bilateral relations, the figure of cooperation was not invoked in the
legal covenants. This lack of cooperation may be read as the influence of liberal
which was known to be strong in the first term
policies on Brazilian government,
94
of Cardoso's administration.
Carlos Iglesias Puente distinguishes two moments in Cardoso's administration
in what concerns cooperation: i) a period marked by the lack of resources (1995-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Figure 2 was prepared by the authors, based on the 1995 Rescheduling Debt Agreement.
94. Kamilla R. Rizzi, Relatbes Brasil-Angola no P6s-GuerraFria (1990/2002), 15 Conjuntura
Austral 287, 289 (2008).
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1996); and ii) a second period of growth and expansion (1997-2001). 9' In the first
period, Brazil signed only three agreements with Angola - including the
Rescheduling of Debt Agreement; 96 while in the second period, seven others were
signed. 97 The expansion of topics and types of cooperation is the most notable
aspect. The two agreements signed in 1999 addressed two aspects connected to
foreign direct investment of Brazil in Angola in that period-considering that the
Capanda Hydropower project's works were restarted in 1997-one agreement
envisaging the cooperation for occupational training in civil construction and
others, and the other on visa procedures. 99 But, in 2000, the cooperation
perspective was definitely expanded to include topics concerning the capacity
building of the Angolan state apparatus, and included new negotiation
techniques-such as having visa standard rules being negotiated under the
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) umbrella. 100 It is also
notable of this last period, that the number of Brazilian public agencies that were
part of the cooperation projects increased.101 These elements were further explored
during President Lula's administration.
3.

Refurnishing the South-South cooperation: new legal tools, new
legal actors

Cardoso's second administration (1999-2002) relaunched the South-South
cooperation 1° 2 and placed some of the basis of a new move on Brazilian foreign

95. CARLOS ALFONSO IGLESIAS PUENTE, A COOPERACAO TtCNICA HORIZONTAL BRASILEIRA
COMO INSTRUMENTO DA POLITICA EXTERNA: A EVOLUtAO DA COOPERA(;AO TtCNICA COM PAISES EM

DESENVOLVIMENTO- CTPD-NO PERIODO 1995-2005, at 168-70 (2010).
96. See Agreement for Debt Rescheduling, supra note 77; see also Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Coopera fto Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica na Area de Formaglo Profissional], Angl.Braz., Nov. 26, 1996 [hereinafter Agreement on Vocational Training].
97. See Agreement on Vocational Training, supra note 96; Acordo sobre a Supressao de Vistos
em Passaportes Diplomiticos e de Servigos [Agreement on Visa Suppression in Diplomatic Passports
and Service], Angl.-Braz., May. 31, 1999; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperag~o Econ6mica,
Cientifica e Tdcnica, para Atividades de Fortalecimento das Instituigdes de Planejamento do Governo
de Angola, Angl.-Braz., Sept. 4, 2000; Protocolo de Inteng6es para Cooperafo Tdcnica no Dominio da
Seguranga e da Ordem Pfiblica, Angl.-Braz., Nov. 14, 2000; Acordo sobre Supressao de Vistos em
Passaportes Diplomiticos, Especiais e de Servigo (no imbito da CPLP), Angl.-Braz., Jul. 17, 2000.
98. WILSON MENDONQA JUNIOR, POLITICA EXTERNA E COOPERAC;AO TtCNICA - As RELA4;OES

DO BRASIL COM A AkFRICA DURANTE OS ANOS FHC E LULA DA SILVA 115-26 (2013).
99. Agreement on Vocational Training, supra note 96; Agreement on Visa Suppression in
Diplomatic Passports and Service, supranote 97.
100. JUNIOR, supra note 98, at 115-26.
101. Id.
102. JUNIOR, supra note 98, at 116, 141 (registering that the policy towards Africa was retaken in
1995, during Cardoso's first mandate (1995-1998), after a downturn in Brazil's economic cooperation
in the region in the two previous decades. Junior also asserts that both Cardoso's and Lula's
governments increased in 721.21% the number of agreements signed with African countries, thirtythree were signed by Cardoso and 238 by Lula); Paulo G. Fegundes Visentini, Africa and the Emerging
Powers: The South and the Unholy Cooperation,3 AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and Int'l.
Relations n. 5, 41, (2014) (presenting additional evidence that President Itamar Franco's administration
(1992-1994) brought back to Brazil's foreign policy an articulated African policy. In this period,
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policy on cooperation.1l 3 They are: I) the intent to reinforce principles for SouthSouth cooperation, either on the rhetoric and official discourses or explicitly in the
legal documents signed; 10 4 ii) the involvement of specialized agencies inside the

federal government, but the management of cooperation programs by one of them,
the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation; 10 5 and iii) the expansion of areas for
cooperation, combining traditional topics on trade and investment with social
10 6
The
issues-such as health and education-and public management assistance.
South Atlantic agenda returned then to the Brazilian foreign policy agenda, gaining
10 7
more and more relevance in the decade ahead, as the Angola case evidences.
Cardoso's conduct with regard to South-South cooperation was immersed in a new
18
This trend distances itself
foreign policy paradigm known as "logistic state."'
from strict neoliberal policies and aims at market liberalism with rules of
reciprocal benefits, expansion of commerce through foreign trade and
corporations, and increased power capacity to be
internationalization of Brazilian
10 9
able to affect the global scene.

Franco targeted key African countries (South Africa, Angola and Nigeria) as priority, and relied on
them to reach neighbor countries. Franco's administration offered strong support, either directly or
through the U.N. to the process of peace and reconstruction of some African countries, especially
Angola).
103. See ZULEIKA ARASHIRA, NEGOTIATING THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, 126-9
(2011).
104. Saraiva, supra note 21, at 7. See also TULLO VIGEVANI & GABRIEL CEPALUNI, BRAZILIAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN CHANGING TIMES: THE QUEST FOR AUTONOMY FROM SARNEY TO LULA, 53-

63(2012)
105. See PENHA, supranote 22; Ribeiro, supra note 70.
106. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 4 (registering the following thematic distribution
of the projects in 2009: agriculture 19%, others 18%, industry 16%, health 14%, education 11%,
environment 6%, security 6%, public management 4%, energy 3%, and technical cooperation 3%).
107. See PENHA, supra note 22; Ribeiro, supra note 70; Lidia Cabral, Cooperaqdo Brasil-Africa
para a desenvolvimento: Caracterizaqdo,tenddnciase desafos, 26 TEXTOS CINDES (2011). As a
reference, the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) from 1998 until
2003 offered credits for more than seventy-nine export transactions to Angola, having the government
of Angola in the capacity of borrower. Eleven Brazilian companies benefited from those credits,
including Odebrecht, which received about 43% of the contracts.
See generally Message from President of BNDES, Summary on the Brazilian Economy: The Strategic
Plan 2000-2005, at 24 (Feb. 26, 2002),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes-pt/Gaterias/Arquivos/empresa/ReLAnu
al/relatoOO.pdf (explaining a funded project with Odebrecht). The amount offered for each export
operation is not open for public consultation on the terms of Law Decree N. 7,724/2012. See Lei
No.7724, de 16 de Maio de 2012 (Braz.). We thank Sarah Marinho research support on BNDES's
regulation and transactions.
108. A "logistic state" is defined as a state not limited to be a service provider (developmental
state), nor a passive observer of the market and hegemonic powers (neoliberal state); but a state that
takes over the strategic planning for development and supports actions taken by other economic and
social actors, with whom it shares responsibilities and power. CERVO & BUENO, supra note 23, at
529. See also FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL REGIME 358-9 (Josd Fldvio Sombra Saraiva ed., 2003).
109. CERVO & BUENO, supra note 23, at 528. Note that the logistic state foreign policy
paradigm introduced in Cardoso's second term (1999-2002) is consolidated in Lula's foreign policy.
Id.at 525, 529; FOREIGN POLICY AND POLITICAL REGIME, supra note 108, at 359.
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With respect to Angola, the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, the leader of
UNITA, facilitated the end of the civil war, which was formalized by the
Memorandum of Understanding of Lusaka. l l° Though Capanda's works had
resumed under severe protection of the government of Angola in 2000,111 the
Brazilian investments to this project and the supply of goods and services to it, as
from 2002, regained central place in the Brazilian foreign policy towards Angola.
Besides, the reconstruction of the state and the development of Angola's state
apparatus, Capanda became a new field for cooperation between Angola and
Brazil.' 12
Analysts argue that Lula da Silva's election as President of Brazil in 2003
intensified Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa. 1 13 Based on a strategic
partnership, Brazil-Africa relations became the focus of Brazil's South-South
cooperation. 114 This was the first year of Lula's administration and of the Labor
Party in the Presidency. The foreign policy of the Labor Party has been driven by
an active effort to strengthen the country's relations with others in the Southern
region of the globe." 5 In November of 2003, Angola and Brazil thus signed

110. Memorando de Entendimento Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaka para a Cessaqo das
Hostilidades e Resolugo das Demais Questbes Militares Pendentes nos Termos do Protocolo de
Lusaka,
Braz.-Angl.,
Apr.
4,
2002,
United
States
Institute
of
Peace,

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace-agreements/angola-04042002.pd
f.
11. INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, supra note 62; ODEBRECHT, supra note 59. (Odebrecht, regardless
of the civil war and the suspension of Capanda's project, decided to keep and diversify its investments
in Angola). See WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 87 (asserting that Odebrecht Group invests
in Angola in construction, mining, supermarkets and shopping malls, energy, agribusiness, and real
state and that the Group has been appointed the largest private employer in Angola).
112. JUNIOR, supra note 98.
113. Visentini, supra note 102 (asserting that soon after elected, Lula implemented structural
changes in the Brazilian foreign services (Itamaraty) in relation to Africa. Besides Africa's Division I
and 2, Brazil broke down the Department on Africa and Middle East to create a new department,
devoted exclusively to the African continent. In addition a new Africa Division 3 was created); Cidudio
Oliveira Ribeiro, Brazil's New African Policy: The Experience of the Lula Government (2003-6), 13
WORLD AFFAIRS (2009). See also Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini and Analicia Danilevicz Pereira, The
African Policy of Lula's Government, AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and Int'l. Relations
(2007) (sustaining that the new African policy of Lula's government is twofold: first, Brazil's
interaction with Africa contributes to increase the country's visibility in the international scene in line
with its objective of becoming a global player. Second, Brazil's African policy is justified by the fact
that several African countries are reach in natural resources already being exploited by China).
114. Visentini, supra note 102 (suggesting that there is, however, a certain degree of debate with
regard to Lula's policy on Africa: while some sustain that Brazil's new proximity with Africa is an
extension of successful social programs implemented in Brazil, others consider the foreign policy of
Lula's government in relation to Africa a waste of resources; and a third group characterizes it as
business diplomacy, different from China's approach only in its shape and intensity). See also Ribeiro,
supra note 113.
115. Tullo Vigevani et. al., Politica externa no periodo FHC: a busca de autonomia pela
integraqdo [Foreign Policy During the Cardoso Period: The Pursuit of Autonomy for Integration], 15
TEMPO SOCIAL (2003); Tullo Vigevani I & Gabriel Cepaluni, A politica externa de Lula da Silva: a
estratdgia da autonomia pela diversificag5o [The Foreign Policy of Lula da Silva: The Strategy of
Autonomy through Diversification], 29 Contexto Int'l., (2007) (applying the official discourse of the
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6
fourteen agreements stressing the trends appointed above."
During Lula's administration, for the first time, official representatives of
both Angola and Brazil finally honored the commitment (expressed at Article IX
17
of the 1980 Cooperation Agreement) of meeting on a two-year basis."
Thereafter, the parties met again in 2005, when they signed seven more
agreements;' in 2007, with eight more agreements signed; 119 and, in 2010, with

Ministry of Foreign Relations of the search for "autonomy" in Brazil's international insertion contrast
the Cardozo days of "autonomy gained by the integration" to the main trends of the world system to
Lula's era that prevailed the "autonomy by diversification of the country's foreign relations").
116. Programa Executivo de Cooperaq o Cultural para 2004 a 2006 [Cultural Cooperation
Executive Program], Angl.-Braz.; Segunda Emenda ao Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaqto
Econ6mica, Cientifica e E6cnica na Area de Formagao Profissional, Firmado em 28 de Abril de 1999
[Second Amendment in Vocational Training Area], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 4, 2003; Protocolo de
Cooperagdo T6cnica na Area do Meio Ambiente [Protocol Technical Cooperation in the Environment
Area], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3. 2003; Protocolo de Cooperagao sobre Cooperagao T6cnica na Area de
Agricultura e Pecudria [Cooperation on Technical Area of Agriculture and Livestock], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Protocolo de CooperaqAo Tdcnica para Apoio ao Instituto de Formagio da Administragto
Local (IFAL) [Technical Cooperation on Support for Local Management Training Institute (IFAL)],
Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Memorando de Entendimento ao Amparo do Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Cooperagao Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para Apoiar o Desenvolvimento do Programa
"Escola para Todos" em sua Fase Emergencial (2004-2007) [Memorandum of Understanding to
Support Program Development "School For All" In Your Emergency Phase (2004-2007)], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Programa de Trabalho em Matdria de Cooperagdo Cientifica e Tecnol6gica [Work
Programme on Scientific Cooperation and Technology], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar no Dominio do Desporto [Complementary Agreement in the Field of Sport], Angl.Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaq o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
para a Implementa¢6o do Projeto "Reorganizagdo, Fortalecimento Institucional e Inovaq6o
Metodol6gica da Extensdo Rual Como Estrat6gia de Desenvolvimento Rural Sustentdvel em Angola"
[Complementary to Project Implementation "Reorganization, Institutional Strengthening and Innovation
Methodology Rural Extension as Strategy Rural Sustainable Development in Angola"], Angl.-Braz.,
Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaqo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para a
Implementa 5o do Projeto "Fortalecimento Institucional dos Institutos de Investigaq.o Agron6mica e
Veterindria de Angola" [Complementary to Project Implementation "Institutional Strengthening of
Institutes Agronomic Research and Angola of Veterinary"], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo de CooperaVIo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para a Implementao do
Projeto "Fortalecimento da Educagao Ambiental em Angola"[Complementary to the Implementation
Project "Strengthening Environmental Education in Angola], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para as Areas do Trabalho,
Emprego e Formagdo Profissional [Complementary on the Areas of Work Employment and Training],
Angl.-Braz., Nov. 3, 2003; Memorando de Entendimento [Memorandum of Understanding], Angl.Braz.
117. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65(providing a compilation of all bilateral meetings
between Angola and Brazil, from 2003 until 2010).
118. Protocolo de Intenq6es sobre Cooperagdo T6cnica na Area de Administraqdo Pblica
[Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Technical Area in Public Administration], Angl.Braz., May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de CooperaqIo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
sobre Cooperagao T6cnica e Procedimentos nas Areas Sanitdria e Fitossanitfria [Technical Cooperation
and Procedures in Areas of Health and Plant Health] Angl.-Braz.,May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar
ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e T6cnica nas Areas de Geologia, Minerag.o e
Tecnologia Mineral [Complementary in Areas of Geology, Mining and Mineral Technology], Angl.Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre Auxilio Juridico Miltuo em Mat6ria Penal [Agreement on Mutual
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During this period, credits to operations with

Legal Aid in Criminal Matters], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre Transfer~ncia de Pessoas
Condenadas [Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Acordo sobre
Extradigo [Agreement on Extradition], Angl.-Braz., May 3, 2005; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo
Bisico de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Brasil e Angola para Implementa Ao do
Projeto "Insergfo Social pela Prdtica Esportiva" [Supplement Agreement for Project Implementation
"Social Inclusion Practice for Sports"], Angl.-Braz., Jan. 19, 2005.
119. Memorando de Entendimento para Cooperagdo com Vistas ao Fortalecimento da
Administrag9o Pblica de Angola [Memorandum of Understanding on Views to Strengthening the
Public Administration of Angola], Angl.-Braz., Nov. 9, 2007; Memorando de Entendimento para
Incentivo AFormago Cientifica de Estudantes Angolanos [Memorandum of Understanding on Training
Incentive for Scientific Angolan Students], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Memorando de Entendimento
para o Estabelecimento de Mecanismo de Consultas Politicas [Memorandum of Understanding for the
Establishment of Political Consulations], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo
Bsico de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Trcnica e Cientifica para a Implementagao do Projeto "Escola para
Todos" [Supplement in Project Implementation "School for All"], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste
Complementar ao Acordo Bdsico de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Tdcnica e Cientifica para a
Implementagato do Projeto "Capacitago para Elaboraqto de Proposta de Reforma Curricular"
[Supplement for Implementation of the Project "Training for the Preparation of the Proposal Reform
Curriculum"], Angl.-Braz.,Oct. 18, 2007;Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo Bisico de Cooperaq~o
Econrmica, Tdcnica e Cientifica para a Implementagto do Projeto "Apoio ao Programa de Prevenq~o e
Controle da Malria" [Supplement for Project Implementation "Support Program Prevention and
Control of Malaria], Angl.-Braz., Oct. 18, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao
Economica, Cientifica e Tdcnica para Implementagdo do Projeto "Capacitagio do Sistema de Safide da
Repitblica de Angola" [Supplement for Project Implementation "Training of the Republic of Angola
Health System"], Angl.-Braz., July 9, 2007; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagao
Econdmica, Cientifica e Trcnica para Implementagdo do Projeto "Formaqdo de Docentes em Safide
Pfiblica em Angola" [Supplement in the Area of "Faculty of Training Health Public in Angola"], Angl.Braz., July 9, 2007.
120. Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o
governo da Repiiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para
Implementagao do "Projeto Piloto em Doenga Falciforme" [Supplement Agreement for Implementation
of the "Pilot Project in Sickle Cell Disease"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Ajuste Complementar ao
Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Govemo da Repiblica Federativa do
Brasil e o Governo da Republica Popular de Angola para Implementagao do Projeto "Apoio A
Implantagdo do Servigo de Sanidade Vegetal e Capacitaqao Thcnica para Inspegdo Fitossanitdria"
[Supplment Agreement for Project Implementation "Support for the Implementation of the Plant
Protection Service and Technical Training for Phytosanitary Inspection"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010;
Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperagdo Econ6mica, Cientifica e Trcnica entre o Govero da
Reptiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Govemo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para Implementavao do
Projeto "Apoio ao Sistema Nacional de Investigagdo Agrdria de Angola" [Supplement Agreement for
Project Implementation "Support for the National Agricultural Research Systems of Angola"], Angl.Braz., June 23, 2010; Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperago Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica
entre o Governo da Republica Federativa do Brasil e o Govemo da Reptiblica Popular de Angola para
Implementago do projeto "Capacitago na Assistncia Trcnica e Extens~o Agriria para Tdcnicos
Angolanos" [Supplement Agreement for the Implementation of the Project "Capacity Building in the
Technical Assistance and Agricultural Extension to Angolan Technicians"], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010;
Ajuste Complementar ao Acordo de Cooperaq o Econ6mica, Cientifica e Tdcnica entre o Govemo da
Repiiblica Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da Reptblica Popular de Angola para ImplementagAo do
Projeto "Apoio AFormagilo Profissional Rural e Promoq5o Social em Angola" [Supplement Agreemnt
for Project Implementation "Support for Training Rural Professional and Social Promotion in Angola"],
Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Acordo de Cooperaqo entre a Repuiblica Federativa do Brasil e a
Repuiblica de Angola no Dominio do Ensino Superior e FormaAo de Quadros [Cooperation Agreement
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Angola only from the Brazilian Development Bank ("BNDES") increased up to
U.S.$3.2 billion.' 21 Trade and investment flows for this period had a22significant
increase in bilateral relations, from millions to billions of U.S. dollars.'
Three innovations in the credit concession and cooperation process,
considerably as from 2006-2007 should be highlighted: i) the new loans were
backed by collateral agreements, as well as on the commitment of debt payments
and on the excess of these payments as guarantees for the new loans (a
combination of Figures 1 and 2 above, as per Figure 3 below), according to the
Protocol of Understanding Angola-Brazil, dated as of October, 18, 2007;123 iW
cooperation processes gained also a triangular format, integrating Northern
countries in the South-South cooperation projects and international
organizations; 124 and, iii) local private companies in Southern countries also
became part of the projects.

on Higher Education and Staff Training], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Acordo de Cooperaq5o entre a
Repfiblica Federativa do Brasil e a Repfiblica de Angola no Dominio da EducaqAo Niio-Superior e
Formaq~o [Cooperation Agreement on Eduction Non-Superior and Training], Angl.-Braz., June 23,
2010; Acordo de CooperaqAo entre a Repfblica Federativa do Brasil e a Repfiblica de Angola no
Dominio da Defesa [Cooperation Agreement in Defense], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010; Declaragao
Conjunta sobre o Estabelecimento de Parceria Estratdgica entre a Rep6blica Federativa do Brasil e a
Repfiblica de Angola [Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership], Angl.-Braz., June 23, 2010.
121. BNDES, RELATORIO ANUAL 2011 [Annual Report 2011] 156 (2011),
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/bndes-pt/Galerias/Arquivos/empresa/RelAnu
al/ra2011/relatorio anual2011 .pdf (explaining Angola approved credit worth one billion U.S. dollars in
2011); Joao Fellet, Com BNDES e Neg6cios BNDE corn Politicos, Odebrecht Ergue 'mpdrio' Em
Angola, ESTADO DE S. PAULO, Sep. 18, 2012, http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,combndes-e-negocios-com-politicos-odebrecht-ergue-imperio-em-angola,932219,0.htm (As previously
mentioned, due to confidentiality reasons, data on the amounts are not regularly published. BBC Brasil,
based on the Law on Access to Information, requested the information about all BNDES concessional
credits to Angola up to 2012, receiving the information of 3.2 billion of U.S. dollars); Francisco Goes,
Brasil Quer Replicar Corn Outros Paomes da Ada es Modelo de Comrcio com Angola. VALOR
ECONOMicO, May 2, 2012, http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/2640008/brasil-quer-replicar-com-outrospaises-da-africa-modelo-de-comercio-com-angola; Angola and Brazil's Two- Way Trade Could Reach
U.S. $2.5 billion in 2007, MACAUHUB.COM, (Oct. 22, 2007),
http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2007/l 0/22/3915/ (explaining an agreement between Angola and
Brazil on finance that allowed for an additional pre-approved credit line on one billion U.S. dollars, for
the term 2008-2009); Guilherme Barros, BNDESAprova US$ 2 bilhaesparaAngola e Negocia US$ 1
bilhdoparaGANA. Isto i Dinheiro.BLOG do GUILHERME BARROS, (Oct. 5, 2012)
http://guilhermebarros.istoedinheiro.com.br/2012/05/10/bndes-aprova-us-2-bilhoes-para-angola-enegocia-us-l-bilhao-para-gana/(announcing that two more billion U.S. dollars had been approved to
Angola). We could confirm part of this number on the following installments, published by official
sources, the concession of 750 million U.S. dollars on credits and guarantees negotiated for the term
2006-2008.
122. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Angola and Brazil's Two-Way Trade Could Reach U.S. $2.5 billion in 2007,
supra note 121.

124. See generally Economic Commission for Africa, South-South and Triangular Cooperation:
Implications for Souther African Countries, ECA-SA/TPUB/SSTC/2011/1
(June 2011),
http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/sro-sa-south-south-triangular-cooperation.pdf.
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Figure 3: Credits and debts in one account
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125. Figure 3 was prepared by the authors, based on the 2007 Protocol of Understanding AngolaBrazil.
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This new structure to provide financial support for trade and investment flows
between the parties-combining and integrating the past debts and the new credits
payments and guarantees-helped to increase the credit lines to Angola from
U.S.$750 million in 2006 to U.S.$1.75 billion in 2007.126 This structure also
proved to be instrumental in the context of the creation of the Brazilian Productive
Development Policy ("PDP") in 2008,127 and its resulting Integration with Africa
Program.12 PDP provided BNDES with a certain direction and framework for
strengthening commercial relations and investment flows
action internationally,
29
into Africa. 1
According to the report prepared by the Institute of Applied Economic
Research ("IPEA") and the World Bank:
This presence, guided by the government via BNDES, placed the bank
at the center of the interaction between domestic corporations and the
African market. One of the goals of the PDP was to choose a small
number of corporations-usually three-capable of engaging in
activities in Africa.
Another goal of the PDP was signing a three-year agreement (2009-12)
between BNDES and the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports
and Investments (APEX). The agreement's
aim was a policy of
130
diversification for Brazilian exports to Africa.
In the case of Angola, the Companhia de Bioenergia de Angola project,
known as Biocom, illustrates such structures well. Biocom is an Angolan plant for
the production of sugar cane, bioethanol, and electric energy, based on Brazilian
technology.' 3' The project is the result of a joint venture between the Brazilian
group Odebrecht (40 percent of the shares of ownership), the state-owned company
Sonangol (20 percent), and a private Angolan company Demer Angola (40
133
percent). 132 The total investment was expected to be around US$400 million.
126. Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa et. al., Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the
Continent?, 36 POLITIKON: S. AFR. J. OF POL. STUD. 59, 76 (2009).

127. WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: Brazil, WT/TPR/S/283 (May 17,
2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tpre/s283_e.pdf. The Productive Development Policy
was created to promote long-term competitiveness for the Brazilian industry, aligning existing industrial
policy tools, and enhancing government/ private sector engagement. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra
note 65, at 79.
128. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 79. The Integration with Africa Program is
aimed at strengthening Brazil and Africa economic relations and increasing Brazilian institutional
presence in Africa.
129. Id.
130. dat 80.
131. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 72. See also About Biocom, BIOCOM,
http://www.biocom-angola.com/pt-br/a-empresa/sobre-a-biocom (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
132. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supra note 65, at 5, 72. See also Rafael Vaisman, Bioethanol
Production in Rural Angola: Benefits and Risk Associated with a Brazilian Technology Transfer

Project, 4 BIORES, March 22, 2010, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/bioethanolproduction-in-rural-angola-benefits-and-risks-associated-with-a
[hereinafter Vaisman, Bioethanol
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BNDES, the Brazilian bank, was one of the funding sources together with Angolan
banks. 134 Yet, international organizations also provided financing to Brazilian
agencies developing technical cooperation activities in Angola, to support the
from Brazil and the United States also included
project. 135 A bilateral initiative
36
financial support for Biocom.'
Biocom is expected to produce 32,000 tons of sugar in its first year of
operation, starting on July 2014.137 In its full capacity, by 2018-2019, this number
shall increase to 246,000 tons, and the mill will also produce thirty million liters of
ethanol per year.' 38 This is significant to a country that has imported 225,000 tons
of sugar per year. 139 Sugar has been one of the main products that Brazil exports to
Angola, 140 but Biocom is seen as one of the projects that may reduce the
dominance of raw materials exports to Angola. 14 1 The Brazilian Agency for the
Promotion of Exports and Investments has worked on figures about exports of
42
machines that may improve the cooperation projects undertaken by Brazil.1
According to Carlos Mathias, a director of Biocom, stated publicly that, "Biocom
was built with parts and appliances from Brazil that holds the new state-of-the-art
on this area. The whole mill was imported from Brazil. If we consider nothing
more than
the appliances imported from Brazil we reach 100 U.S million
43
dollars."'

Production in Rural Angola]; Bioenergy Reporter, Angola: Brazilian Odebrecht Agroindustrial is
Starting Production of Ethanol,CONBIO(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.conbio.info/post/angola-brazilianodebrecht-agroindustrial-is-starting-production-of-ethanol/.
133. Id.
134. Id. at72; Rafael Vaisman, Cooperagdo Brasil-Angola na produqao de etanol [Brazil-Angola
in Ethanol
Production],
6 PONTES, Apr. 21,
2010,
http://www.ictsd.orgibridgesnews/pontes/news/coopera%C3%A7%C3%A3o-brasil-angola-na-produ%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-etanol.
See also lsaias Albertin de Moraes & Rodrigues Bessa Mattos, Cooperaqdo Brasil-Aifrica em
Biocombustiveis Durante a Governo Lula: uma Parceria para o Desenvolvirnento, 3 REVISTA
CONJUNTUR AUSTRAL 54 (2012).

135. See Moraes & Mattos, supra note 134, at 277; SERGIO SCHLESINGER, COOPERA(CAO E
INVESTIMENTOS INTERNACIONAIS Do BRASIL: A INTERNACIONALIZA(CAO DO ETANOL E DO BIODIESEL
(FASE ed., 2012).
136. SCHLESINGER, supra note 135, at 9-12 (referencing the involvement of the Ministry of
Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, and EMBRAPA, having the latter received funds from the
Interamerican Development Bank, the IDRB, and from the International Fundo for Agriculture
Development.)
137. Bioenergy Reportersupra note 133.
138.

Cana:

Odebrecht

Started

Operations

in

Angola

in

July

2014,

APLA,

http://www.apla.org.br/cana-odebrecht-inicia-operacoes-em-angola-em-julho-de-2014 (last visited Oct.
6,2015)
139. Id.
140. See generally Vaisman, Bioethanol Productionin RuralAngola, supra note 133.
141. About Biocom, supra note 132.
142. See generally Press Release, Brazil Machinery Solutions, Apex-Brazil and ABIMAQ Renew
2015),
to
Promote
Segment
Exports
(July
3,
Agreement
http://www.brazilmachinery.com/site.aspx/Detalhe-Release-ING?codNoticia=k+gS90vGjLc=.
143. Cana: Odebrecht Started Operations in Angola in July 2014, supra note 139 (translation by
authors).
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Stories in the media suggest that Biocom project also received lines of credit
from private banks in Angola, such as Banco Espirito Santo. 144 There are also
statements that Brazilian private and public-private banks have signed agreements
with Angolan private banks in the last few years. 145 These banks could be
replacing then the National Bank of Angola in Line 3 of the structures of financing
above.' 46 Such new figures can be changing and making the structures of support
for cooperation projects between Angola and Brazil and the integration of their
economies more complex.
III. CONCLUSION
Considering that South-South coalitions have implemented significant
changes in world trade and investment geography, this paper explored the main
legal instruments that have stimulated and increased the economic ties between
Angola and Brazil. The political and economic relations between these two
countries dates back to the 1970s, but as from the 2000s the flows of trade and
investment increased significantly.
The legal arrangements supporting the increase of such economic flows differ
from the models of trade and investment agreements-traditionally structured as
RTAs and BITs-and they have their own design. The main feature of these
agreements between Angola and Brazil is the pooling of complementary initiatives
dealing with trade, investment, finance, and technical cooperation. The goal is to
make the initiatives of economic integration viable. In this sense, we noticed a
current transmission system where investment flows are based on trade flows of
goods and services that also depend on financing provided by other trade flows,
and part of this is complemented or supplemented by South-South cooperation
initiatives.
During the forty years of economic transactions between the two countries,
such operations became more sophisticated, comprising a larger number of
domestic public and private agents from both Angola and Brazil. Even though
increasing in numbers and focuses of activity, these operations are still few, and
their interconnection is vital. The public development and commercial banks, the
public companies, and the few private companies, as well as the governmental
foreign policy entities, try to be in tune. Brazil-Angola economic relations are then
characterized by a close connection of public and private law instruments, and
public and private parties very often become part of the same transactions. While
these regulations rely on government-to-government commitments, they
nonetheless combine these commitments with commercial contracts between
exporters and importers, agreements on procedure between public financial
institutions, and supply contracts between state oil companies. Such arrangements
allow Brazil and Angola to address problems related to: i) lack of financing for
trade and investment, by relying on loans collateralized by oil; and ii) to the lack of
144. See Vaisman, supranote 134.
145. WORLD BANK AND IPEA, supranote 65.
146. See supra Figure 3.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 43:4

1 47
technical capacity, by establishing South-South cooperation projects.

In that sense, having the case of Angola and Brazil as an example, it seems
that South-South relations may have been designed by different legal arrangements
other than those that have prevailed for North-South relations-mainly the RTAs
and BITS models. The ambition of South-South arrangements may be based
firstly on overcoming the economic partners' limits to the international economic
system, such as on financing and capacity building. Secondly, their hybrid public
and private dimensions may be also in line with the constituent and operational
particularities of their own capitalist system and peripheral economies.
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